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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Jurisdiction-Resident Judge and Regular Judge at
Chambers or' on Vacation
Is the jurisdiction of a resident judge at chambers concurrent with
that of the regular term judge at chambers? Two recent North Caro-
lina cases have thrown a shadow across this question. In the first of
these cases, Hill v. Stansbury,' the plaintiffs sued Guilford County
Commissioners for an accounting of public funds unlawfully expended
and at that time disclaimed any right personally to participate in the
recovery. Judgment was awarded to the plaintiff. Both sides noted
an appeal and then later entered a consent judgment before the resident
judge of the 12th Judicial district at chambers. The amount of the
judgment was paid to the clerk of Guilford County. The plaintiff then
filed petition before the same resident judge asking for reimbursement
for expenses and counsel fees, and this petition was granted. On ap-
peal the Supreme Court held that the resident judge had no jurisdiction
over the petition for expenses; also the court questioned the right of
the resident judge to enter the consent judgment by saying, "His juris-
diction over the matter, if at any time he had any (Italics mtpplied.),
ended with the signing of the consent judgment dismissing the ap-
peals."'2 In the second case, State Distributing Corp. v. Travelers In-
denrnity Co., involving the validity and extent of an insurance binder,
a resident judge entered judgment at chambers upon an agreed state-
ment of facts. In the Supreme Court the majority entirely omitted
any reference to the jurisdictional phase but reversed the lower court's
decision on another ground. Justice Barnhill 4 voted to affirm the lower
court's decision, but primarily argued that there had been no juris-
diction in the lower court. The jurisdictional argument was based on
two points: (1) Although G. S. 7-655* apparently confers concurrent
jurisdiction on a resident judge in those matters of which the Superior
Court has jurisdiction out of term, actions pending on the civil issue
- 224 N. C. 356, 30 S. E. (2d) 150 (1944).
'Hill v. Stansbury, 224 N. C. 356, 357, 30 "S. E. (2d) 150, 151 (1944), cited
supra note 1.
*224 N. C. 370, 30 S. E. (2d) 377 (1944).
'Justices Seawell and Devin concurred in the dissent.
1* N. C. GEN. STAT. ANN. (Michie, Sublett, & Stedman, 1943) §7-65. "In
all cases where the superior court iti vacation has jurisdiction, and all of the
parties unite in the proceedings, they may apply for relief to the superior court
in vacation, or in term time, at their election. The resident judge of the judicial
district and the judge regularly presiding over the courts of the district, shall
have concurrent jurisdiction in all matters and proceedings where the superior
court has jurisdiction out of term."
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docket are not included. In support of this Justice Barnhill pointed to
the dictum of the Stansbury case as controlling. (2) Since this was a
controversy without action under G. S. 1-250,6* only the judge who
would have had jurisdiction had the cause been submitted to a jury
(Italics supplied.) had authority to hear it at term or, by consent, out
of term.
Often there are two or more judges of the Superior Court in the
same district at the same time, i.e., the resident judge of the district and
the judge holding the regular terms of court.7* In some instances this
situation leads to confusion, well illustrated by the two instant cases, as
to which judge has jurisdiction. "It may be generally stated that the
judge holding the courts of the district in regular succession is the only
proper judge, and has sole jurisdiction in civil actions in such district
during the six months of his assignment. The resident judge has no
more authority than any other judge, except when holding the courts
of his district, unless specially authorized by statute."8& However, G. S.
7-659 literally gives the resident judge of the judicial district and the
judge regularly presiding over the courts of that district concurrent
jurisdiction in all matters of which the Superior Court has jurisdiction
"out of term." According to McIntosh, ". . . 'term time' means the
time while the court is actually in session; that is, from the day of the
opening of the court to the day of the adjournment when the judge fi-
nally leaves the bench. 'Vacation' is the period of time between two
terms of court in a county, and it may also refer to the time during a
term when the court is not actually in session, as during a recess."' 0
The latter half of this statement refers to what is called "chambers busi-
ness." Further substantiating the synonymy of these phrases, McIntosh
says, "Hearings before a judge outside of the courthouse, or out of the
regular session of the court at which business is to be done, are said to be
at chambers and are called 'chambers business.' ",1 "In a case of motions,
a* Id. 91-250. "Parties to a question in difference which might be the subject
of a civil action may, without action, agree upon a case containing the facts upon
which the controversy depends, and present a submission of the same to any court
which would have jurisdiction if an action had been brought. But it must appear
by affidavit that the controversy is real, and the proceedings in good faith to de-
termine the rights of the parties. The judge shall bear and determine the case,
and render judgment thereon as if an action were pending."
* The North Carolina Superior Court system is divided into two divisions, the
east and the west, which are further subdivided into districts whose number is
determined by the legislature. Each district elects a judge of the Superior Court
who resides in that district and who rotates from district to district within his
division for terms of court. The districts include a number of counties, and ajudge holding a term of court in a district spends some time in each county.
N. C. GN. STAT. ANN. (Michie, Sublett, & Stedman, 1943) §§7-68, 7-69; McIN-
TosH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES (1929) §§26,
27, 41-46.
MCINTOSn, op. cit. supra note 9, §49. 'See note 5 supra.
"0 MCINTosH, op. cit. supra note 9, §50. " Id. at §51.
1944]
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orders and other proceedings which may be heard by the judge out of
term, that is, in vacation or at chambers, the court is always open...., 2
Syllogizing, it would appear that the jurisdiction of the regular judge
of the district out of term, that is to say, of the business conducted be-
tween two terms of court or in chambers in recess of a session, would
be concurrent with the jurisdiction of a resident judge who likewise is
in vacation or at chambers. Case examination leads to a confused
picture of this situation.
The term "regular" judge will be used hereafter to designate the
judge who at that time is holding a regular term of court in order to
distinguish him from the "resident" judge.13* The first phase of the
problem to be discussed is the jurisdiction of the regular judge at
chambers or in vacation.
An early North Carolina case, Bynum v. Powe, laid down a set of
rules as to what may be done out of term: "... all ordinary civil actions
must be brought to and proceeded in to their regular determination at
regular terms of the Superior Courts. This is the general course and
extent of procedure, and there is no authority of the court or judge to
grant orders, judgments, or take any action in such action out of term,
except in respects specially provided for, such as provisional remedies,
proceedings supplementary to execution, submitting a controversy with-
out action, confessing judgments without action, applications for man-
damus and the like."'1 4 Two cases prior to the Bynum case allowed
the regular judge out of term to amend the records, 15 and to appoint
a receiver and amend an order made at term.1 6 There is another
situation when there may be jurisdiction out of term. In addition to
what is strictly chambers business as set out in the Bynun case, the
regular judge may hear matters or motions outside of the courtroom
with the consent of the parties.17 Such consent has been given in cases
involving a judgment settling dower rights given after a term of court
expired;18 a judgment rendered in vacation in another county than
where the action was pending;19 a judgment given out of term in an
action for damages for trespass ;20 an action for dissolution and settle-
ment of a corporation ;21 and a petition by a stockholder for appoint-
2 Id. at §40.
"* This comment does not include, in scope, a discussion of the jurisdiction
of special judges.
1497 N. C. 374, 382, 2 S. E. 170, 173 (1887).
Falkner v. Hunt, 68 N. C. 476 (1873).
1 Coates Bros. v. Wilkes, 94 N. C. 17.4 (1886).1
'State v. McLeod, 222 N. C. 142, 22 S. E. (2d) 223 (1942); Delafield v.
Lewis Mercer Construction Co., 115 N. C. 21, 20 S. E. 167 (1894).
8 Shackelford v. Miller, 91 N. C. 181 (1884).9 McDowell v. McDowell, 92 N. C. 228 (1885).
2 Hawkins v. Richmond Cedar Works, 122 N. C. 87, 30 S. E. 13 (1898).
"1 Clark v. Eugenia Mfg. Co, 150 N. C. 372, 64 S. E. 178 (1909).
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ment of a receiver of a corporation. 22 An interesting fact situation is
found in Bank v. Ginmer2s where the plaintiff sued on a note, and the
defendant filed no answer. The plaintiff consented not to enter judg-
ment by default on the condition that if any other creditor of the de-
fendant entered a judgment, the plaintiff's judgment by default could
be signed by another judge in vacation in another county. Such out
of term signing was upheld. In Cogburn v. Henson,24 the trial ended
on a Saturday, and since the judge wanted to catch a train, both parties
agreed that the jury might return a verdict and that the judgment
might be signed out of term and out of county. This case was upheld
even though the judge did not sign a verdict consistent with the jury's
findings, the Supreme Court refusing to read into the agreement any
words limiting the judge's signing of the judgment to that which the
jury decided.
On the other hand, an early case refused jurisdiction at chambers
to a regular judge of an action of mzandanus to compel the state auditor
to collect a tax. This case turned on a strict interpretation of a statute
whereby mandamus must be made by summons and complaint, and the
summons "shall be returnable to the regular term .of the Superior
Court." 25 In a case of a nmndamus action to enforce a money demand,
the court refused jurisdiction to a judge at chambers because a statute
made service for mandamus for a money demand returnable only at
term time; but applications for writs to enforce other demands could
be returnable at chambers.2 6 Where a receiver for an insolvent cor-
poration was appointed and property ordered sold and an interpleader
was entered for a prior lien on the property, on which interpleader the
parties joined issues, it was held reversible error for a regular judge
at chambers to decide the merits of the interpleader.2 7 In a case where
a judgment by default was entered in a civil action to require the de-
fendant to deliver a tax deed, it was decided that the judge, who at his
home after the term of court ended signed an order vacating the judg-
ment by default, had no authority to do this. 28 A judge who signed a
judgment while standing in front of his boarding-house after he left the
courtroom was found to have no jurisdiction.2 9 A similar case ruled
that a judge had no authority to amend a judgment, after a session of
court, in his hotel room without the consent of the opposing counsel.30
22 Killian v. Maiden Chair Co., 202 N. C. 23, 161 S. E. 546 (1931).
118 N. C. 668, 24 S. E. 423 (1896).
179 N. C. 631, 103 S. E. 377 (1920).
Belmont v. Reilly, 71 N. C. 260, 262 (1874).
'
8 Rodgers v. Jenkins, 98 N. C. 129, 3 S. E. 821 (1887).2 7N. C. Bessemer Co. v. Piedmont Hardware Co., 171 N. C. 728, 88 S. E.
867 (1916).28Dunn v. Taylor, 187 N. C. 385, 121 S. E. 659 (1924).
29 May v. Nat. Fire Ins. Co., 172 N. C. 795, 90 S. E. 890 (1916).
'
0 Hinton v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 116 N. C. 22, 21 S. E. 201 (1895).
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In a bastardy proceeding the court decreed that a judge at chambers
could not decide an appeal without the consent of the prosecutrix.8 1
Since an examination of those cases which have denied jurisdiction
to a regular judge at chambers or in vacation has revealed nothing which
would preclude a regular judge from hearing matters, other than strictly
chambers business, out of term by consent of the parties, it would seem
that in the Stansbury case consent judgment could have been heard ade-
quately out of term. But the Stansbury case had one further point in that
the consent judgment was entered not only out of term, but by a resident
judge instead of by the regular judge who would have heard the case
had it come up on the civil issue docket. It is this point that Justice
Barnhill in the Indemnity Co. case stresses so strongly. Based upon the
previous inference drawn from a literal interpretation of the G. S. 7-65,
it would seem that if the jurisdiction of the resident judge and the
regular judge at chambers are concurrent in proceedings where such
consent had been given for the judgment to be rendered out of term,
it would not matter if it were heard before a resident judge or the
regular judge before whom it might have been heard according to the
civil issue docket.
The conclusion that there should be no difference in jurisdiction
between a regular judge at chambers and a resident judge at chambers
despite the fact that the case was pending on a civil issue docket seems
to have some foundation in the case of City of Reidsville v. Slade.32
Here the defendant obtained a restraining order from the regular judge
of the 10th Judicial district to prevent the plaintiff from taking his
land by eminent domain. The plaintiff then had the injunction dis-
solved before the resident judge of the 12th Judicial district at chambers
while he was holding courts of the 21st district, and the jurisdiction
of the resident judge at chambers was upheld. Concededly, this ver-
dict may have been substantially justified by the injunction statute in
question, G. S. 1-498, but it seems to be some authority also for a resi-
dent judge deciding an issue which was pending on a civil issue docket
in another district. In Edmundson v. Edmundson,3 3 there is found a
case somewhat parallel with the fact situation in the Stansbury case.
In the Edmundson case the question turned on whether a resident judge
had jurisdiction at chambers to sign a consent judgment out of the
county and out of the district in which the cause was pending when at
that time by the law of rotation he was holding the courts of another
district. The Supreme Court held that he had such jurisdiction. It
is to be noted however, that the reident judges, in both of these cases,
were holding courts in districts other than that of their residence al-
State v. Parsons, 115 N. C. 730, 20 S. E. 511 (1894).
-224 N. C. 49, 29 S. E. (2d) 215 (1944).
"222 N. C. 181, 22 S. E. (2d) 424 (1942).
[Vol. 2
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though both decisions were rendered when the courts were not in ses-
sion but at chambers. It could be argued that they rendered the
decisions in the capacity of resident judges of their home districts.
Nothing more is to be found in the Stansbury case to substantiate
the idea that the resident judge could not have rendered the consent
judgment which was pending on the civil issue docket other than the
slight doubt cast by the court as to the jurisdiction of the judge who
signed a subsequent petition-"if at any time he had any." It would
appear that the Edmundson case at least would support the jurisdiction
of the resident judge on this point and be in accord with the con-
clusion drawn from G. S. 7-65.
Yet jurisdiction of a resident judge has been restricted in two cases
before the Edmundson case. In Moore v. Moore3 4 the plaintiff ap-
pealed from a judgment reducing alimony in a divorce action pending
in A. county, which was rendered by a resident judge of the 13th dis-
trict at chambers who at that time was assigned to duty in the 15th
district. The court in granting the appeal said that the judge of the
district who was assigned under the rotation system had sole jurisdic-
tion except in those cases otherwise specially provided by statute, and
those exceptions in civil cases are restricted to restraining orders, in-
junctions, appointment of receivers and habeas corpus proceedings. In
Ward v. Agrillo35 a resident judge was refused jurisdiction to hear
and determine an appeal from a judgment of a Superior Court clerk
of any county in his district because he was not at any time holding
courts of his district under assignment or by exchange or under special
commission.
Whether the decision of the Edmundson case in effect overruled
these earlier cases was a question avoided by the court in deciding the
Stansbury case. The court in the latter case only hinted at the fatality
of the jurisdiction of the resident judge to render a consent judgment
in a case pending on a civil issue docket. It would seem that Justice
Barnhill in his dissent to the Iidemnity Co. case perhaps placed more
reliance on the Stansbury case than was justified.
The Indemnity Co. case involved a controversy without action which
was submitted to the jurisdiction of a resident judge while pending on
the civil issue docket. There are numerous cases where controversies
without action have been submitted to regular judges at chambers for
decision.36 In each of these however, the judge was judge of the
131 N. C. 371, 42 S. E. 822 (1902).
' 194 N. C. 321, 139 S. E. 451 (1927) ; accord, Howard v. Queen City Coach
Co., 211 N. C. 329, 190 S. E. 478 (1937).
"8 Consolidated Realty Co. v. Koon, 216 N. C. 295, 4 S. E. (2d) 850 (1939);
Privott v. Graham, 214 N. C. 199, 198 S. E. 635 (1938) ; General Realty Co. v.
Lewis, 212 N. C. 45, 192 S. E. 902 (1937); Swain County v. Welsh, 208 N. C.
439, 181 S. E. 321 (1935); Webb v. Port Commission, 205 N. C.,633, 172 S. E.
1944]
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district, presiding out of term or at chambers by consent of the parties.
The question of a resident judge's jurisdiction to decide at chambers
a controversy without action seems to be a new problem. A somewhat
analogous situation arose in the case of Greene v. Stadiem where it was
held that a special judge had no jurisdiction to decide at chambers a
controversy without action when he was not holding a term of court.
This decision was based on a narrow interpretation of G. S. 1-250. It
is this same interpretation that Justice Barnhill argued for in the dissent
of the Indemnity Co. case. G. S. 1-250 allows a controversy without
action to be brought before any court which would have had jurisdic-
tion if an action had been brought. Since G. S. 7-65 confers concur-
rent jurisdiction on the resident judge only in those matters of which
the Superior Court has jurisdiction out of term, and since controversies
without action may be submitted before the regular judge of a district
at chambers or out of term by the consent of the parties, it would seem
that the resident judge would have concurrent jurisdiction; and, ap-
parently, the majority of the court in the Indemnity Co. case so thought
-as nothing whatsoever was mentioned in the opinion as to the juris-
dictional question. However, Justice Barnhill seems to have read G. S.
1-250 as a limitation on G. S. 7-65 so as to leave only the judge who
would have had jurisdiction had the cause been submitted to a jury
the authority to hear it out of term by the consent of the parties.
Justice Barnhill concluded his dissent on the jurisdictional phase
with the thought that the resident judge should be given concurrent
jurisdiction in all matters not requiring the intervention of a jury or
in which trial by jury has been waived. It is submitted that perhaps
that authority is already established, as the majority in the Indemnity
Co. case seemed to think, by a literal reading of G. S. 7-65; but it is
agreed that legislative action definitely settling this problem of over-
lapping jurisdiction would be welcomed by the legal profession.
IDRIENNE E. LEVY.
Damages-Personal Injuries-Reduction to "Present Value" for
Future Injury-Instructions--Appeal and Error
In a recent case' the plaintiff was injured by the negligence of the
defendant's truck driver at Pope Field, Fort Bragg, N. C. The fol-
lowing charge was submitted by the trial court relative to the measure
of damages: " . . . if you come to consider that question ( damages)
you have a right to take into consideration the age of the plaintiff at
377 (1934) ; Mitchell v. Board of Education, 201 N. C. 55, 158 S. E. 850 (1931) ;
City of Charlotte v. Shepard, 120 N. C. 411, 27 S. E. 90 (1897) ; Arnold v. Porter,
119 N. C. 123, 25 S. E. 785 (1896); Brem v. Lockhart, 93 N. C. 191 (1885);
Harrell v. Peebles, 79 N. C.-26 (1878) ; Hervey v. Edmunds, 68 N. C. 243 (1873).1Daughtery v. Cline, 224 N. C. 381, 30 S. E. (2d) 322 (1944).
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